In early 2001, Dongyang county opened the Zhuxi Chemical Industrial Park on land belonging to Huaxi and Huangshan villages, and announced it would relocate a pesticide factory there. From the outset, villagers opposed placing a plant notorious for its pollution in the park. On 20 October 2001, a group of Huaxi and Huangshan residents sought a "dialogue" (duihua 对话) with the town party secretary, which led to the secretary being cursed, beaten and dragged to the park, where he was made to walk a lap around the grounds barefoot. Windows and doors of three chemical plants were smashed, and phones and computers in factory offices were vandalized.
Following this incident, twelve villagers were prosecuted for disturbing social order and ten were jailed for one to three years. This deterred additional protest for two and a half years and cleared the way for relocation of the pesticide plant and a large expansion of the park, which soon came to occupy 960 mu (about 64 hectares). At its peak, the park contained 13 factories, mainly producers of chemicals, pesticides, dye, and pharmaceuticals. Nearly all the factories generated a substantial amount of water and air pollution.
On 16 April 2004, Zhejiang province published a notice in Zhejiang Daily
announcing that industrial parks that had not been lawfully established should be shut down. The Zhuxi park was on the list because the county had not followed the appropriate procedures to secure land for it. The activists jailed following the 2001 protest were encouraged by the announcement and decided to take the government and the polluters to court, but their efforts to pursue a lawsuit and a wave of petitioning that followed did not produce any redress. to the park and began a round-the-clock vigil. Their hope was to block delivery of supplies, thereby forcing the factories to shut down. Huashui town officials and police dismantled the tent the next evening, but the protesters immediately erected a second one. Over the next 10 days, despite efforts to pull down the tents, the size of the encampment grew, as residents from about ten other villages joined the protest, with each village erecting its own tent. County leaders then turned to a more forceful approach. At about 3am on April 10th, the county leadership sent in over 1,500 local cadres and public security personnel to put an end to the encampment. During their efforts to clear out the protesters, violence broke out and over 100 officials or police officers and more than 200 villagers were injured; sixty-eight government vehicles were also burned or damaged. In the wake of the "April 10th Incident", the protesters still refused to withdraw and the number of tents grew to about 30, representing 22 villages. Meanwhile, the violence had attracted media attention and higher levels of government, including Beijing, sent a team of investigators to look into the protest and the county's response. Under mounting pressure from above and below, Dongyang county agreed to close 11 of the factories in the park, and on 20 May the protesters allowed their tents to be taken down.
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To understand how SSCs mobilized the tent-sitters, the first author did fieldwork in Huashui from 10 April to 28 July 2007. She revisited the area in April 2008 to observe the first village elections after the protest. Altogether, she conducted 122 semi-structured interviews, with most arranged in a snowball fashion as one person put her in touch with the next. The interviewees ranged from protest leaders to village 16 In places where protest did not occur, most of the industrial parks that the province ordered shut stayed open under a new name. In Huashui, many of the 11 closed factories were relocated outside the county. For example, the plant that produced the most pollution was moved to Nantong city, Jiangsu. See Fu Piyi and Zhang Ran, "Huanjing baohu shiguan qiye shengsi cunwang" [Environmental Protection is of Vital Importance for Corporations]. Jingji cankao bao [Economic Information Daily], 9 November 2007. cadres, township cadres, municipal officials, and ordinary villagers. Taking advantage of her affiliation with a newspaper, she enjoyed exceptionally good access to both local leaders and protesters. Her quasi-official capacity also made it possible to collect nearly one thousand pages of written materials, including petition letters, leaflets, and posters penned by villagers, work diaries and reports written by local officials, official regulations, meeting records, and an internal "Daily Report" (Meiri yibao 每日一报) that meticulously traced what happened each day.
Mobilizing Protesters
Huashui's SSCs were the major player in the effort to close the factories. In June 2004, three of the activists who had been imprisoned for opposing relocation of the pesticide factory in 2001 sought to hire a Beijing law firm to sue the polluters and Dongyang county, but they were told that legal fees could reach 500,000 yuan.
Lacking this sum, they turned to the SSC in Huaxi No. 5 village to secure donations from villagers. The SSC held two meetings to discuss the request, agreed to help, and promptly launched a fund-raising campaign. A government report described what happened next: SSC members went door-to-door to solicit contributions. Each donation should be over five yuan. Now they have collected 40,000 to 50,000 yuan. Receipts were provided, which noted the amount of money contributed, who made the donation and who received it. The receipts also had an illegal seal affixed reading "Society of Senior purpose for which the donation was sought.
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Despite a month of soliciting, the money raised amounted to far less than the 500,000 yuan needed. The activists thus could not afford to hire the Beijing law firm. Local lawyers were unwilling to take the case, so the three men, with the SSCs in Huaxi, Xishan and Huangshan behind them, changed their strategy. They started petitioning higher levels. Over the next year, several SSC members and a leader of the 2001 protests went to the prefecture and provincial capital numerous times to submit petitions. They even travelled to Beijing twice to ask the Centre to look into the pollution and the terms under which the land for the park had been requisitioned. Meanwhile, groups of SSC members were dispatched to Huashui town and Dongyang county to urge increased oversight of the factories. Yet another SSC member, on his own, sent hundreds of petitions to government offices from the county up to Beijing. All these efforts failed to produce the hoped-for results.
The Huaxi No. 5 SSC was especially active during the petition drive. According to the work diary of an SSC leader, it held meetings almost every day to discuss the environmental crisis and what to do about it. Sometimes, the SSC convened several times in a single day to study laws and regulations, elect petitioners' representatives, and craft strategies. The number of participants at these sessions ranged from several dozen to about 500. Attendees were mostly Huaxi No. 5 SSC members and a handful of younger villagers, sometimes joined by SSC activists from other villages. Third, SSCs provided logistical support for tent-sitters. As a town cadre put it:
"They were sitting there, with others sending them food, serving them, and giving them money". 26 The party secretary of Huashui commented, with an equal measure of disdain and frustration:
Why was the encampment sustained for so long? Because they [the tentsitters] could get five yuan per night and they ate quite well. . . . Perhaps those old ladies had never eaten instant noodles before or had these tasty drinks. So they were quite happy camping there, regarding the tent area as a nursing home and an entertainment centre.
Fourth, SSC members applied pressure on elderly villagers who were reluctant to join the encampment. Throughout the protest, the local government sent cadres who knew or were related to the protesters to persuade them to stand down. 27 Some tentsitters were "transformed" (zhuanhua 转化) and gave up protesting, but others continued "going on duty" (zhiban 值班) at the encampment. An officer from the Huashui police station explained:
When we learned that some older villagers were about to begin their shifts, we had to go do "thought work" (sixiang gongzuo 思想工作) on them. We begged them not to go and told them that the local government was solving the environmental problem. Some older villagers said, "I have to go on duty. Otherwise I will be accused of 31 About 50 natural villages in Huashui town did not take part in the protest, mainly because they were far away from the chemical park and their residents had fewer environmental grievances.
In the end, most older villagers from Huaxi, Xishan and Huangshan were drawn into the effort, and many senior citizens from neighbouring communities also took part, either as participants or supporters. And almost all our interviewees, both officials and villagers, emphasized the contribution SSCs made to protest mobilization. A Huashui police officer called the Society "the commander-in-chief at the front". A Huashui town cadre noted that "SSCs played the role of 'charging forward'" (chongfeng xianzhen 冲锋陷阵) and managing activities in the encampment. The party secretary of Huaxi No. 5 village, who sympathized with the tent-sitters and was ousted because he failed to convince them to stand down, gave full credit for closing the chemical park to "older people and their organizations".
How SSCs Are Able to Mobilize Protest
In rural Zhejiang, SSCs are often significant actors owing to the resources they control.
32 According to The Law for Protecting Senior Citizens' Rights (1996), more developed villages may use the income stream from collectively-owned assets to fund pensions and other expenditures. Most communities in rural Zhejiang are reasonably well-off and village leaders often assign SSCs revenues from village fish ponds, forests, markets, buildings, and farmland. In Huaxi, the SSC has the right to operate the local market. By the mid-2000s, the SSC received about 130,000 yuan annually from leasing vegetable, fish, meat, and clothing stalls. After remitting 20,000 yuan to the Huaxi village committee and 7,000 yuan to the Department of Urban Management, 33 it still earned over 100,000 yuan in rental income every year. In Xishan, another village that produced a large number of tent-sitters, the bulk of the SSC's income derived from membership fees paid by residents over the age of 55, donations from local entrepreneurs, and rent from 12 collectively-owned fish ponds.
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SSCs in Huashui use these revenues, in part, to offer services to their members.
At the time of the protests, the Huaxi Society was the best-funded and largest SSC in Huashui, with about 1,600 members. 35 It owned a spacious three-story building, which housed its offices and an entertainment centre. The centre had television sets and DVD players, as well as numerous mah-jongg and poker tables. The Huaxi SSC also established study groups. Older villagers routinely came to the centre to read books and newspapers, and to discuss current affairs. Every spring the SSC organized trips to tourist sites. On holidays it gave its members small gifts, such as towels, cooking oil, and moon cakes. When elderly villagers fell ill, the SSC sent representatives to visit them. When members died, it dispatched staff with a funeral wreath to mourn them. Every year, to celebrate the birthday of the villagers' common ancestor, the SSC allotted 20,000 yuan to hire a theatre company to perform a series of Wu operas; the festivities surrounding this continued for three days and four nights.
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In addition to robust finances, Huashui's SSCs enjoyed substantial autonomy. Finally, the physical vulnerability of older protesters facilitated SSC mobilization.
Although some older villagers were too feeble to protest, others could take advantage of the fact that it was unseemly for representatives of state power to use force on the elderly. 46 As one town cadre who participated in efforts to break up the encampment put it: "Those older people could hit me, but I couldn't hit them back". The director of the Dongyang Public Security Bureau reportedly felt handcuffed when dealing with dozens of elderly tent-sitters and complained:
If I arrest those gray-haired 70-80 year-olds, how could I shoulder the responsibility? I cannot afford to feed them, since their eyesight is poor and they cannot work. The responsibility would be greater yet if one of them died during detention.
The vulnerability of the elderly made it more difficult to use force to end the encampment, which emboldened the early tent-sitters and helped draw in new recruits.
Strong finances, organizational autonomy, good leadership, and a deep pool of biographically-available, unafraid protesters all served SSC mobilization. As might be expected, however, the ability to manage a petition drive, turn out tent-sitters, and keep protesters at an encampment for nearly two months concerned local authorities greatly and led to efforts to check the influence of Huashui's SSCs. 45 In rural China, most people keep track of their "nominal age" (xusui 虚岁), which is one year older than their actual age. We do not have information on whether any 69-year old protesters were detained. 46 This was especially true after the violence of 10 April 2005 led to injuries. Even before that, elderly protesters were not detained and the 1,500 cadres and public security officers dispatched to deal with several dozen elderly protesters were instructed to remove the tents but to avoid striking tent-sitters. On local authorities being in a "morally weak position" and fearing intervention from above if they use force on elderly protesters, villages. He said: "Most active SSC members are either retired cadres or workers.
Most of them are capable. If they are well directed, they are very 'tractable' (tinghua 听话). Otherwise, they can be very stubborn".
The Resilience of Huashui's SSCs
The reorganization only had a limited effect. The reorganization changed little for three main reasons. First, local officials had come to depend on SSCs to assist and manage senior citizens and they needed SSCs to deliver services that the local government did not provide. So, though Societies in natural villages were instructed to shut down, none were actually closed. Second, the skill of SSCs in organizing contention made the authorities hesitant to cut off their funding out of fears it would trigger further protest. SSC revenues were left unaffected by the reorganization. As long as SSCs had their own funding sources, they retained considerable autonomy and an ability to intervene when community interests were at stake. Third, the reforms did not alter how village SSC leaders were chosen: they continued to be elected by SSC members. 53 The restructuring did not grant town SSCs the authority to appoint either directors or deputy directors of village 52 Confiscating seals, which are symbols of organizational power, did hamstring village-level SSCs and make it more difficult for them to organize contention and give it an official imprimatur. open letter: "I will try my best to solve the SSC's difficulties and take good care of the elderly. In particular, I will work to increase SSC income and improve societal management. I will also draw on good practices from other places, providing living subsidies for older people and organizing their travel".
Some Implications
How often do SSCs mobilize protest and are the achievements of Huashui's Societies likely to be replicated elsewhere? As a case study, this research report is not well-suited to address these questions. Moreover, there are factors specific to
Huashui that helped its SSCs overcome obstacles that may exist in other locations. Still, there is evidence that SSC-led protest is growing. 60 And there are reasons, beyond rising discontent and well-situated SSCs, that this trend may continue. For one, "mission drift" can be a mechanism by which SSCs become more significant.
Protest often addresses widely-held grievances and, especially when it is successful, can empower SSCs in an environment where other non-state organizations are few and weak. Becoming a force that stands with the community against officials or companies that misbehave is undoubtedly a high risk strategy for organizational development, but not an unreasonable one.
Demographics also favour SSCs and offer them room to grow. As migration empties the countryside of younger men and women, SSCs are becoming a vehicle for the people who are left-the elderly-to participate in politics, even contentious politics. 61 Compared with the young, who might depart at any time, the elderly have become the main stakeholders in many villages and the most dogged defenders of community interests. 62 SSCs are well-placed to take on new roles when the younger men who typically dominate politics are absent. With numbers and resources behind them, SSCs can be a factor in local politics, especially if 1) local entrepreneurs back them, 2) they have former cadres leading them, and 3) lineage ties and respect for the elderly make it difficult to clamp down on them. As was evident in Huashui, SSCs may resist government pressure and efforts to depoliticize them, and it may not always be easy to re-route Societies back toward harmless service activities.
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The events in Huashui also speak to our understanding of mobilizing structures and the potential for sustained protest organization. Governance in the countryside is changing, and non-state organizations are playing a bigger role. The importance of groups such as SSCs in service provision, in particular, has made it difficult for the authorities to maintain a prohibition on horizontal mobilization, and failed crackdowns may become more common as organizations with similar structures and goals develop ties with each other and create an infrastructure for single and multivillage mobilization. Still, we need to learn much more about cross-community (and cross-organization) cooperation and how the authorities respond to it. How and how often do SSCs and other organizations communicate with each other? Why are some types of coordination permitted, while others are harshly repressed?
Finally, this study suggests an understanding of protest outcomes that goes beyond the success or failure of a given episode to examine long-term consequences 62 SSCs may be more concerned with certain issues, especially land use and environmental degradation, partly because many left-behind, older villagers still depend on land for their livelihood, and partly because they have an ancestral connection to the land and recognize that soon enough they will be buried there. 63 SSCs may also be turned to state purposes. See Mette Halskov Hansen, "Organising the Old: Senior Authority and the Political Significance of a Rural Chinese 'Non-Governmental Organisation'", Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 42, No. 5 (2007 ), pp. 1057 . A recent survey also shows that while SSCs can mobilize protest, their "mediating capacity" also enables them to be deployed to contain and canalize activism. See Hurst, Liu, Liu and Rao, "Reassessing Collective Petitioning in Rural China".
